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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.MILDRED N. CORN,VELL,
~,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(

vs.

No.

10557

RAY H. BARTON,
)
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff for personal
injuries received when plaintiff slipped and fell on
a common walkway through apartments owned and
operated by defendant, the plaintiff being a guest of
one of the tenants.
l

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The case was tried to the court sitting with a jury.
From a finding of no negligence and judgment for
defendant, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment entered
on the verdict and an order granting plaintiff a ne\I'
trial.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed the complaint against defendant for
injuries received when she slipped and fell while using
a common walkway through an apartment house complex owned and operated by him, while staying at said
apartment as a guest of her mother, on the 5th day
of February, 1964'. Plaintiff's mother was living in an
apartment at the address of 2014 View Street. (See
Exhibit 2-P). In order to proceed from this apartment
to 21st South Street, a person would walk from 20H
due south on a walkway between two triplexes being
numbered 1321, 1323, and 1325 on the west and 1331,
1333, and 1335 on the east. (Exhibit 2-P). Plaintiff
slipped and fell on the walkway opposite 1335 as shown
by a mark made by plaintiff on Exhibit 2-P (R. 107).
Plaintiff testified that between 12 :30 and I :00
P.l\I. she left the apartment of her mother and proceeded south on the walkway. At that time there was a
2

light covering of snow over the entire walkway. Plaintiff did not feel that there was enough snow to warrant
orershoes. The temperature was freezing. (R. 89).
Plaintiff did not observe any footprints on the walkway, she being apparently the first person to walk on
said walkway following the snowfall. (R. 90). Plaintiff testified that she arose between 8 :00 and 9 :00 A.M.
that morning; that the weather conditions outside were
called to her attention by a telephone call from her
brother-in-law, Pierce Brady, and that she observed
that there was a medium snowfall occurring. She made
the observation of the snowfall shortly after arising.
(R. 88). Plaintiff further testified that she left the
apartment of her mother shortly after lunch. She noticed
while they were eating lunch that the sun had come
out, and she decided to leave for her shopping expedition to Sugar House. (R. 88). Plaintiff proceeded out
of the apartment, down the steps, and south along the
walkway to the place in question. She was wearing
walking shoes. ( R. 89). At the point in question her
feet suddenly went out from under her, and she fell
onto her back and head. ( R. 90) . After the fall, plaintiff observed that she had slipped on a sheet of ice
which was concealed by the thin covering of snow. She
described the ice as being V-shaped and going across
the sidewalk from east to west; that it tapered off a
bit toward the west; that it was approximately 2 feet
at its widest part and tapered smaller going west. (R.
!ll ) . Plaintiff had not noticed any ice in this vicinity
prior to the fall. (R. 105).
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Mrs. Florence Davis testified for defendant. She
and her husband were the caretakers for Dr. Barton.
She testified that she was called to the scene after Mrs.
Cornwell had fallen, and that she observed the spot
where she fell. She described the ice at this place as
having the shape of an oval, about 2 feet long. (R.
162). She testified that she had been in the area the
day before and had observed that the walks were dry
and clear. (R. 163). She testified that she and her
husband had the responsibility of keeping the walks
free of ice and snow and had been furnished with
shovels, cement broom, and rock salt; that it had been
their practice to scrape ice and to use salt to keep them
free of ice. (R. 161-163). Mrs. Davis testified that on
the day in question she had been away from the apart·
ments from approximately 9:30 A.M. to somewhere
between 11 :30 and noon; that the walks were dry when
she left and when she came home there had been a light
snowfall; that after arriving home she fixed lunch for
herself and her daughter; that they had lunch; and
that she then received a telephone call just after she
had started sweeping the snow. She testified that the
time was between l :00 and l :30 P.M. (R. 160-162).
On cross examination Mrs. Davis admitted that
she did not actually proceed down the walk in question
but had walked past the area to the north on her way
to the garbage cans the day before, during the fore·
noon and the afternoon, and that she had not observed
any ice on the walks; but if she had, she would have put
salt on said places. (R. 164). l\Irs. Davis further testi·
4

lied that she and .l\Ir. Davis had two grown daughters
Jjyiug at home who helped with the duties of maintaining the walks; that a 24-year-old daughter was at home
during the morning in question. (R. 165). She further
testified that they \Vere careful to observe occasions
when there was melting and freezing occurring with
resulting patches of ice on the walks, and that when
ice appeared, they would use rock salt. Mrs. Davis
testified that she observed the skid marks of Mrs. Cornwell' s heels and that she then swept off the snow in that
area and placed salt on the ice. (R. 167).
lHr. Davis testified that he performed the services
of a eustodian for Dr. Harton for a consideration, (R.
153) and that Dr. Harton had furnished him with the
necessary equipment to perform these services, including snow shovels and rock salt; that whenever it would
snow, he or one of the members of his family would
go out and shovel the snow or sweep the walks; that
whenever the temperature would warm up so as to cause
snow to melt and then freeze into patches of ice on the
walks, they would take rock salt and sprinkle the same
on the ice. He testified that he recognized ice on the
walks would constitute a hazard to the tenants. Mr.
Davis testified that salt was not placed on the walks
the day before the accident; that if he had seen a patch
of ice the day before, salt would have been used. (R.
154-155). 1\ilr. Davis testified that there were elderly
people and particularly elderly ladies living in the
apartment house complex, particularly .1\Irs. Uuck, .1\Irs.
DaYidson at 20U, an elderly lady at 1337, Mrs. 'Vatson
5

on the top of the east of the sixplex, Mrs. Yates at
the top of 2014, and Mrs. Cornwell's mother at 2014.
(R. 155-157).
The records from the United States ';\T eather
Bureau show that there was one inch of snow on the
ground on February 3 and 4, 1964, and that intermittent snow or light snow flurries began on February
5, 1964, at 8 :32 A.M. and continued intermittently
until 12 :05 P.l\'1.; that a snow depth of 2 inches of
snow was on the ground at 5 :00 P.M. February 5,
1964; that temperatures were above freezing for about
one and one half hours on February 4, 1964; and that
temperatures were belmv freezing all of February 5,
1964. (Exhibit 4-P).
The hourly temperature readings on Exhibit 8-P ~
for February 3, 1964, show temperatures for the entire
24-hour period of below freezing, ranging from a low ,
of 10 to a high of 28. Exhibit 7-P for I~-.ebruary 4,
1964, shows temperatures ranging from a low of 12
to a high of 34. The exhibit shows a reading of 34 °F. '
recorded at 1 :55 P.M. on February 4, 1964; that another reading of 34 °F. was recorded at 2 :56 P.M.;
and that the readings of 12:55 P.M. and 3:55 P.M.
were both 31°F. Exhibit 4-P shows a maximum temperature reached on February 4, 1964, at 2 :15 P.M.
of 36.4 °F. The above shows that for the period of time
from at least 1 :55 P.M. to 2 :56 P.M. on the 4th day
of February, 1964, the temperatures were above freeiing and that these were the only above-freez;ing tem-
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peratures recorded for the entire period of time from
February 3, 1964, past the time of the accident Oil
February 5, 1964. Exhibit 6-P showed temperatures
for l'-.ebruary 5, rangipg from a low of 17 to a high
of 30, the high of 30°F. being recorded at 1:55 P.M.,
which was after the occurrence of the accident in question.
The recordings on all of the weather records discussed aforesaid were made at the Salt Lake City Airport. The conclusion from the weather records is inescapable that the patch of ice in question was in
existence for a minimum time of from 3 :55 P .M. on
the day prior to the accident to and including the time
of the accident, or close to 24 hours.
The evidence showed that plaintiff suffered injuries necessitating a total of $1,212.96, (Exhibit 1-P)
in medical expenses, occasioned by a nerve root irritation consistent with a disc syndrome involving nerve
roots at the 4th or 5th lumbar interspaces. (R. 115144).

The case was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories given as instruction No. 28 (R. 62). The
jury answered the first interrogatory:
"'Vas the defendant guilty of negligence?
"Answer: No."
As a result of this answer, the jury was not re(p tired to answer any of the additional interrogatories,
and the court entered judgment thereon in favor of
7

defendant and against plaintiff, "No Cause of Action."
(R. 67-68).

Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial (R. 65)
which was denied on January 10, 1966. (R. 66).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 CONSTITUTED A
DIRECTED VERDICT AND VIOLATED THE
RULE THAT A FORMULA INSTRUCTION
MUST CONTAIN THE THEORIES OF ALL
PARTIES.
Instruction No. 9 reads as follows:
"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that water or moisture had accumulated
on the walkway because of melting snow or other ·
natural conditions which became frozen into ice,
and that its presence was not revealed because
of newly fallen snow; and, if you believe that 1
these conditions were the result of natural sea·
sonal weather conditions, such accumulation or
presence of ice would not constitute negligence
on the part of defendant or his agents." ( R. 43).
Instruction No. 9 was Defendant's Requested In·
struction No. 5. (R. 20).
Defendant requested Instruction No. 5 (a) (R.
33) to be given only in the event the court did not give
Request No. 5, as follows:
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"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that ice and snow had accumulated on the
walkway as the result of natural seasonal conditions, and the defendant or his agents did not
in the exercise of reasonable care have a reasonable opportunity to remove the snow prior to the
time plaintiff fell and to discover the icy spot,
the defendant would not be negligent." (Italics
ours).

The court gave Requested Instruction 5 and did
not give Requested Instruction No. 5 (a).
Instruction No. 9 constituted a directed verdict
because admittedly the ice and snow in question were
the result of natural seasonal weather conditions.
Plaintiff's theory was that the defendant was negligent in failing to discover and remedy the ice condition. Yet the court told the jury in Instruction No. 9
that if the ice resulted from natural seasonal weather
conditions, its presence would not constitute negligence
011 the part of defendant. The very thing that plaintiff
is complaining about is the unnecessary presence of the
ice at the time of the fall. Its presence, whether the same
could and should have been removed or not, is said by
the court to not constitute negligence. This instruction
eliminates entirely any duty whatsoever to inspect,
discover, and remove accumulations of ice, regardless
of how long and how notoriou.y the existence of same.
This simply cannot be the law. It negates the entire
common law concept of duty to exercise ordinary care
to discover and remove hazardous conditions that may
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cause lllJury to invitees and tenants on a landlord',
premises. 'Vlrnt the trial court has done to the Restate.
ment and to Harper and James by this instruction
is somewhat shocking to say the least. The court doesn'!
say, "unless defendant had a reasonable opportunit)
to discover the ice and failed to exercise ordinary care
to discover and remove same, in which event he would
be negligent." 1'he court simply states that this defend ant is not negligent if the ice accumulated as a
result of natu,,re's act, no matter how long it had re·
mained and how clear the opportunity to remove same.
Instruction No. 9 is objectionable for the addi·
tional reason that it is a "formula" instruction which
fails to include the theory of plaintiff that defenda11t
failed to exercise ordinary care to discover and remedy
the dangerous condition. It should be obvious from n
mere reading of the instruction that it is prejudicial
error, inasmuch as it tells the jury if the condition of
the ice was the result of natural seasonal weather con·
ditions, defendant is not negligent, without calling to
the jury's attention the fact that defendant has an
affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to make
common walkways safe. This type of an error was
contained in an instruction given by the trial court in
the case of lvlf v. Richardson, ( 1959) 9 Utah 2d 5.
336 P.2d 781. This case dealt with a personal injury
received by plaintiff from being hit by a car backing
out of a driveway. The instruction in question in the
Ivy case was :
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"If you find from a preponderance of the
that the defendant failed to keep and
mamtam a proper lookout for the plaintiff in the
driveway where the accident occurred and that
such failure proximately resulted in the accident,
then your verdict must be in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant."

e\'i~leu~e

Coucerning this instruction, the court stated at page
786:

"The above instruction, taken by itself, is in
error because it fails to take into account the
possible contributory negligence of the plaintiff. This kind of instruction, sometimes referred
to as a 'formula instruction,' which makes a recital iu accordance with the contention of a party
and ends with the conclusion: ' * * * and if you
so find, then your verdict must be for (the
party) ', is not generally a good type of instruction to give. This is so because it lends itself to
the error just noted and also because it tends to
be argumentative rather than to set out the principles of law applicable to the issues impartially
as to both parties. For such reasons it is better
to avoid giving instructions of that type. It is
conceded that the issue of contributory negligence was propertly covered in the next instruction. This, however, pitted one instruction
against the other and might have been confusing
to the jury."

The Iv;1J case follo-..vs the well-recognized general rule
(Jf law as stated at 88 C.J.S., page 927, par. 351:
"The giving of an instruction directing a verdict if the .i ury should find specified facts are
established is not error and is not improper as
11

directing a verdict. However, an instruction
directing a verdict if the jury should find speci
fied facts are established,. must include all th1
circumstances which must concur to warrant th1
verdict and the failure to include all of the111
is not cured by giving other instructions." (Italic~
ours).
A further statement covering this type of an instruc·
tion is contained at 89 C.J.S., TRIAL, Section 441,
at page 37:
"Where an instruction purports to sum up all
the facts, the proof of which will warrant a ver·
diet for a party, the instruction must be correct,
and, if erroneous or incomplete, it is not sus·
ceptible of cure by any other instructions, unless
such instruction properly refers to, and incor·
porates within its terms, other given instructions
which properly submit such omitted elements.
A binding, mandatory, or peremptory instruc·
tion, or one directing a verdict, if erroneous or
incomplete, cannot be cured by any other in·
structions.''
This rule is further elaborated on at 53 Am. J ur.,
TRIAL, par. 518, at page 459:
"A judge, who may not indicate an opinion
at any stage of the trial on an issuable fact,
may not participate in the verdict by so declar·
ing the law as to ignore or minimize legitimate
contentions of fact of one party to the advan·
tage of the other. Thus, an instruction whi~h
directs a jury to find for the plaintiff on certam
facts stated therein is erroneous if it does not
refer to facts that tend to show an affirmative
defense."
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Also see 1lloore v. Turner, 137 W. Va., 299, 71
S.E.2d 342, 32 A.L.R.2d 713; and Hustad v. International Oil Company, 52 Md. 343, 202 N.W. 814.
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 5 (a)
shows that counsel for defendant realized the requirement of balancing instructions; however, the trial court
failed to take note of this principle and gave the original
request. Of course, plaintiff's theory was that the
defendant was negligent in failing to discover and
remedy a dangerous condition. The questioned instruction tells the jury that if they find that the condition
was the result of natural seasonal accumulations of
ice and snow, that defendant is not negligent. The
jury in answering the first question had to follow the
mandate given them in Instruction No. 9.
The error contained in Instruction No. 9 cannot be
cured by other instructions. The case of Konold v. The
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 21 Utah 379,
60 P. 1021, states:
"Instructions on a material point in the case
which are inconsistent or contradictory, should
not be given. The giving of such instructions is
error, and a sufficient ground of reversal because
it is impossible aft.er verdict to ascertain which
instruction the jury followed, or what influence
the erroneous instruction had in their deliberation. This has been so uniformly held that citations are unnecessary."
The error committed by Instruction No. 9 is componnded by Instruction No. 11, reading as follows:
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"The defendant, as the owner of the premis'''
was 110t a guarantor against the occurrence oi
the accident in which the plaintiff sustained
injury. If you find from the evidence that the
defendant or his employees were unaware of the
slippery condition which caused plaintiff to fa!L
and under the circumstances could not liave reasouably anticipated the existence of said condition, then you must find the defendant was not
negligent.''
The vice of this instruction is emphasized when
it is realized that the instruction is coupled with the
introductory phrase that the defendant is not a guarantor against the occurrence of accidents and then goes
on to state that if the defendant or his employees were
unaware of the slippery condition, and under the cirl'.Ulllstances could not have reasonably anticipated its
existence, the defendant was not negligent.
'l'he evidence shows that a person would have to
anticipate the formation of ice on a sidewalk during
a period of time when there existed temperatures for
a time above freezing, follmved by temperatures thereafter which were subfreezing. A person must kno11
that when temperatures are above freezing, sno-w and
ice melt; and whe1~ temperatures are subfreezing, water
freezes. This instruction accentuates the error con·
tained in Instruction No. 9 and is extremely prejudiciaL
inasmuch as it is slanted toward the defendant's theory
and contains no balancing phrase showing the theon·
of the plaintiff, that the defendant as an apartment
house owner has a duty of exercising reasonable care

14

tu discover and correet dangerous conditions on common
walkways.

POINT II
'l'lIE SUH.MISSION OF UN A VOIDABLE
ACCIDENT IN INSTRUCTION NO. 5 CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERR 0 R TO
PLAINTIFF.
Instruction No. 5 states as follows:
"The law recognizes unavoidable accidents.
An unavoidable accident is one which occurs in
such a manner that it cannot justly be said to
have been proximately caused by negligence as
those terms are herein defined. In the event a
party is damaged by an unavoidable accident,
he has no right to recover, since the law requires
that a person be injured by the fault or negligence of another as a prerequisite to any right
to recover damages." (R. 39).
If defendant claims that unavoidable accident is
a separate and affirmative defense, then certainly it
shoulcl have been pleaded. Defendant made no such
plea. The recent modern trend of authorities in this
country has labeled unavoidable accident as an immaterial issue ancl prejudicial to plaintiffs. The reason
for this has been that courts have realized the simple
trnth, that mrnvoidable accident is giving defendant
an additional defense of nonnegligence to which he is
11ot entitled. In the other instructions the court has
e\plained to the jury the duty of the defendant toward
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the plaintiff, and that if plaintiff fails to prove a rio.
lation of the duty proximately caused her injurie),
then plaintiff cannot recover. It is prejudicial for tht
court tu give defendant another arrow to his bow b!
instructing the jury on unavoidable accident as a sepa
rate defense. There is no such separate affirmatin
defense recognized by the general tort law.
In 1958 California repudiated a line of prior
authority and clearly and definitely held that an instruc·
tion on unavoidable accident is error. This was done in
the case of Butigan v. Yellow Cab Company, 49 Cal
2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65 A.L.R.2d 1. This case in·
volved a collision between the Yellow Cab and an auto·
mobile driven by the other defendant, when the cao
going north attempted to turn, according to the cal1
driver, into a driveway of the other side of the street
in order to turn around and proceed north. The cah
driver claimed that as he was attempting to make thi.1
turn, his engine killed, and he became stalled and wa1
then hit by the southbound automobile driven by the
other defendant. The other defendant claimed that the
cab suddenly came into his lane without any stopping
or stalling. The court held that an instruction on mi:
avoidable accident was reversible error. In so doing,
the court discussed the history of the concept of unavoid·
able accident. The court stated at page 504:
"In reality, the so-called defense of unavoi<l·
able accident has no legitimate place in our plead·
ing. It appears to be an obsolete remnant froni
a time when damages for injuries to person or
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property directly caused by a voluntary act of
the defendant could be recovered in an action
of trespass and when strict liability would be
imposed unless the defendant proved that the
injury was caused through 'inevitable accident.'
Although exactly what was covered by this expression is not clear, it apparently included cases
where the d~fendant was utterly without fault.
'Unavoidable accident' was then an affirmative
defense to be pleaded and proved by the defendant. (See 2 Harper & James, The Law of
Torts-1956, 7,Ji7 et seq.; Prosser on Torts-2d
Ed. 1955, 118).
"In the modern negligence action the plaintiff
must prove that the injury complained of was
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, and the defendant under a general denial
may show any circumstance which militates
against his negJ!gence or its causal effect. The
so-called defense of inevitable accident is nothing
more than a denial by the defendant of negligence, or a contention that his negligence, if
any, was not the proximate cause of the injury
* * * . The statement in the quoted instruction
on 'unavoidable or inevitable accident' that these
terms 'simply denote an accident that occurred
without having been proximately caused by
negligence' informs the jury that the question
of unavoidability or inevitability of an accident
arises only where the plaintiff fails to sustain
his burden of proving that the defendant's negligence caused the accident. Since the ordinary
instructions on negligence and proximate cause
sufficiently show that the plaintiff must sustain
his burden of proof on these issues in order to
recover, the instruction on unavoidable accident
serves no useful purpose. * * *
17

"The instruction is not only unnecessary, hul
it is also confusing. 'Vhen the jurors are tolil
'in law we recognize what is termed an unavoid.
able or inevitable accident' they may get the
impression that unavoidability is an issue to bt
decided and that, if proved, it constitutes a sepa·
rate ground of nonliability of the defendant.
Thus they may be misled as to the proper manner
of determining liability, that is, solely on the
basis of negligence and proximate causation.
The rules concerning negligence and proximate
causation which must be explained to the jury
are in t~1emselves complicated and difficult to
understand. The further complication resulting
from the unnecessary concept of unavoidability
or inevitability and its problematic relation to
negligence and proximate cause can lead only
to misunderstanding."
The court went on to hold that the giving of the
instruction was prejudicial.
Following the rationale of the Butigan case, the
Oregon Supreme Court in 1964 held that the giYing
of an unavoidable accident instruction is error in the
State of Oregon. See Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or. 2J,
393 P.2d 217. This case involved what is commonly
referred to as a "darting out" case, where an 8-year·
old girl was hit by an automobile and killed. The Oregon
Supreme Court states in part, at page 222:
"In the modern law of negligence the doctrine
of 'unavoidable accident,' or, as it is sometimei
called, 'inevitable' or 'pure' accident, is a?
anomaly. By definition--at least by the defim·
tion adopted by this court-it has no place a)
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a separate ~~ud irnlependent element in an action
based on negligence. As pointed out by Paul
G. Rees, Jr., of the Ariwna llar, in a scholarly
article entitled 'Unavoidable Accident-a l\li~
understood Concept,' 'the Restatement of Torts
does not treat unavoidable accident as an entitv
of the law,' 5 Ariz. Law Rev. 225, footnote Ii,
at 228. No instruction on unavoidable accident
is included in the Uniform Jury Instructions
in negligence cases drafted by the Committee on
Procedure and Practice of the Oregon State
Bar, and approYed by the judges of the Circuit
Court of l\Iultnomah County on February 21,
190:3. As this court has repe~tedly declared, an
unaYoidable accident is nothing more nor less
than an accident which occurs without anyone's
fault. In practical effect, when included in the
charge of the court to th~ jury, it is lagniappe
to the defendant-not only because it is an
added 'you-should-find-for-the-defendant' type
of instruction, but because it may be misunderstood by the jury as constituting some sort of
separate defense. By its very nature it has led
this court-and we apprehend other courts-to
regard the 1;efus al to give the instruction as no
ground for reYersal, to attempt to delimit the
type of cases to which it is applicable, to declare
that eYen in those cases it is discretionary with
the trial judge and to admonish caution in the
use of the instruction. "rha t is to guide the
<liscretion of the judge in a particular case is
by no means clear."

The eourt then refers to the Butiyan case and states as
follows on page 22:3:
"This reasoning is in full accord with what
this court has said in nu.merous decisions, and
19

makes unavoidable the conclusion that instni,
tions on unavoidable accidents in negligen
cases are without value and may be prejudicial

1

Following this line of authorities, the Supretli
Court of Colorado, in 1964, in the case of Lewis, et o!
v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., et al., ____ Col. ____ , 396 P.i,
933, did away with unavoidable accident instruction·
in the State of Colorado. This case had to do will
personal injuries caused by the overturning of a stage
coach which was a concession run on defendant's property. The court, following the line of authority of tl11
Butigan and Fenton cases, stated at page 941:
"This instruction should not have been giren
Instructions on negligence and contributory mg·
ligence are sufficient and inclusive of so-callee
unavoidable accidents. To further instruct 01
unavoidable accident serves only to twice tel
the jury that the plaintiff cannot recover unh
he proves negligence.
"Though this court has sanctioned the girin;
of instructions on unavoidable accident and, 01:
occasion, held it to be reversible error to refust
to so instruct, we now determine that to gin
such instruction or to recognize unavoidablt
accident in an action based on negligence, as aL
independent element, separate and apart frorn
negligence and contributory negligence, is improper."
And again at page 942:

"'¥e conclude that from and after announce-

ment of this opinion an instruction on unaroi~
able accident should never be given; and, thoug!
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recognizing that accidents may be unavoidable,
now go on record holding that a plea of unavoidable accident may not be set up as a separate
or independent defense and that to now instruct
on unavoidable accident is error. 'Ve expressly
overrule previous announcements of this court
to the contrary."
The clear trend of authorities toward condemnation of unavoidable accident instructions in automobile
collision cases can be seen by examing an annotation
following the Butigm1 case at 65 A.L.R. 2d page 12.
See also the following: C arlburg v. Wesley H ospi,tal
and Nurse Training School, (1958), 182 Kan. 634,
323 P.2d 638; Tyree v. Dunn, ( 1957) ____ Okl. ____ , 315
P.2d 782; Cohen v. Kaminetsky, (1961), 36 N.J. 276,
176 A.2d 483; Bennett v. McCready (1960), 57 Wash.
2d 317, 356 P.2d 712; Kreh v. Trinkle (1959), 195
Kan. 329, 343 P.2d 213; Whittaker v. Green (1948),
191 _Md. 712, 62 A.2d 630; Leach v. Great Northern
Railway Cornpany (1961), 139 :Mont. 84, 360 P.2d 94;
Loser v. Sklar, ( 1959), 357 Mich. 166, 97 N.W.2d 617.
The propensity for injecting confusion into the
minds of the jurors by using the unavoidable accident
instruction becomes apparent when we consider that to
the layman, untutored in the technicalities of tort law,
an accident is an unintended injury. Lawyers appreciate that unintended injuries may be subdivided into
two kinds : I. Unintended and nonnegligent, (for
which in general and apart from situations to which
strict liability attaches, there is no liability) ; and 2.
t'nintended and negligent, (giving rise to liability for
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the tort of negligenee) . Considered in the foregoin'.
light, it becomes apparent that the use of the veri
term "unavoidable accident" carries with it a very prejt;
dicial connotation. The serious risk is that the .Jlll')
will reason as follows:
"The defendant didn't mean to injure tht
plaintiff; it was only an accidental injury, witJ1.
out design, deliberation, or intent; on this vie11
of things, the judge has instructed us that our
sworn duty is to find for the defense."
In speaking of the tendency of such an instructior
to create confusion, the court stated in Carlbur9
v. The Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School
(I958), I82 Kan. 634, 323 P.2d 638, at page 641:
"Generally speaking, when an accident J)
caused by negligence, there is no room for appli·
cation of the doctrine of 'unavoidable accident.
even though the accident may have been 'ineY1t·
able' or 'unavoidable' at the time of its occur·
rence, and one is not entitled to the protection
of the doctrine if his negligence has created,
brought about, or failed to remedy a dangerom
condition resulting in a situation where the acci·
dent is thus 'inevitable' or 'unavoidable' at the
time of its occurrence. In other words, a person
is liable for the combined consequences of an
'inevitable' or 'unavoidable' accident and his ow1 1
negligence.''

It can well be appreciated that the unavoidable
accident instruction is prejudicial to the plaintiff when
this instruction is considered in combination with In·
structions 9 and I I. Instruction No. 9 has prepared
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the grmuHl work hy instruding the jury that defendant
ri is uot negligent if the iee resulted from natural seasonal
u 1reather conditions. Instruction No. 11 adds the concept
:·1 that defendant is not a guarantor and not responsible
if his employees did not or should not have known of
the dangerous condition. In this context the court then
It
instrnds that defendant is not responsible for an un11·
aroidable accident. It is obvious that from Instructions
11
11
\land 11 the jury is directed that this was an tmaYoidable accident and then Instruction No. 5 instructs the
jury that defendant is not responsible for unavoidable
accidents. This combination of instructions most certaiuly constitutes a directed verdict for the defendant.
Xo answer other than the answer given by the jury
eould result if the jury is to follow these instructions.
The instruction on unavoidable accident is extraneous to the issues and evidence of the case at bar,
and it was prejudicial error for the court to give it.
See 1lloore v. Denver & Rio Grande TVestern RR. Co.
(HJ5t>), 4 U.2d 255, 292 P.2d 849; and White v. Pinne:lJ
(HJ40), 99 U. 484, 108 P.2d 24<9, which hold that in
L'tah it is error to giYe instructions on extraneous issues
nen though they may be abstractly correct.
CONCLUSION
The jury could not have answered the interrogator\'. a11v
. other wa .v under the instructions. Instructions
Xos. !l and 11 told the jury that if the ice conditio11 resulted from natural seasonal weather concli-
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tions, the defendant is not negligent; and further, tba'
the defendant is not a guarantor against the occurrell(i
of an accident. Instruction No. 11 further told the jur.'
that if defendant's employees were unaware and undl~
the circumstances could not have reasonably anticipate1J
the existence of the ice, defendant is not responsiblr
In this situation the court delivered the crushing bl(J\'
by instructing the jury that the law recognizes un·
avoidable accidents and that plaintiff cannot recorn
for an unavoidable accident.
These instructions constituted a directed verdic:
for defendant. Not only did the court deliver mandator!
instructions purporting to cover the entire case withlllr
including plaintiff's theory, but the court also instructeli'
on unavoidable accident, which was an extraneou,
matter and reversible error in and of itself.
With slanted, prejudicial, and erroneous instrn·
tions such as these, plaintiff did not receive a fair jun
trial.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgmel!
should be reversed and the case remanded for a nev.
trial.

Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, 'VALLACE, ROBERTS
& BLACK
JOHN L. BLACK
Attorneys for Appellant
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